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Abstract—In a cognitive radio network, a secondary user learns
the spectrum environment and dynamically accesses the channel
where the primary user is inactive. At the same time, a primary
user emulation (PUE) attacker can send falsified primary user
signals and prevent the secondary user from utilizing the avail-
able channel. The best attacking strategies that an attacker can
apply have not been well studied. In this paper, for the first time,
we study optimal PUE attack strategies by formulating an online
learning problem where the attacker needs to dynamically decide
the attacking channel in each time slot based on its attacking
experience. The challenge in our problem is that since the PUE
attack happens in the spectrum sensing phase, the attacker
cannot observe the reward on the attacked channel. To address
this challenge, we utilize the attacker’s observation capability.
We propose online learning-based attacking strategies based on
the attacker’s observation capabilities. Through our analysis, we
show that with no observation within the attacking slot, the
attacker loses on the regret order, and with the observation of
at least one channel, there is a significant improvement on the
attacking performance. Observation of multiple channels does not
give additional benefit to the attacker (only a constant scaling)
though it gives insight on the number of observations required to
achieve the minimum constant factor. Our proposed algorithms
are optimal in the sense that their regret upper bounds match
their corresponding regret lower-bounds. We show consistency
between simulation and analytical results under various system
parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays the demand to wireless bandwidth is growing
rapidly due to the increasing growth in various mobile and IoT
applications, which raises the spectrum shortage problem. To
address this problem, Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has authorized opening spectrum bands (e.g., 3550-
3700 MHz and TV white space) owned by licensed primary
users (PU) to unlicensed secondary users (SU) when the
primary users are inactive [1, 2]. Cognitive radio (CR) is a
key technology that enables secondary users to learn the spec-
trum environment and dynamically access the best available
channel. Meanwhile, an attacker can send signals emulating
the primary users to manipulate the spectrum environment,
preventing a secondary user from utilizing the available chan-
nel. This attack is called primary user emulation (PUE) attack
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
Existing works on PUE attacks mainly focus on PUE attack
detection [10, 11, 12] and defending strategies [5, 6, 7, 8].
However, there is a lack of study on the optimal PUE attack-
ing strategies. Better understanding of the optimal attacking
Kai Zeng is the corresponding author
strategies will enable us to quantify the severeness or impact
of a PUE attacker on the secondary user’s throughput. It will
also shed light on the design of defending strategies.
In practice, an attacker may not have any prior knowledge
of the primary user activity characteristics or the secondary
user dynamic spectrum access strategies. Therefore, it needs
to learn the environment and attack at the same time. In this
paper, for the first time, we study the optimal PUE attacking
strategies without any assumption on the prior knowledge
of the primary user activity or secondary user accessing
strategies. We formulate this problem as an online learning
problem. We also need to mention that the words play, action
taking, and attack are used interchangeably throughout the
paper.
Different from all the existing works on online learning
based PUE attack defending strategies [5, 6, 7, 8], in our
problem, an attacker cannot observe the reward on the attacked
channel. Considering a time-slotted system, the PUE attack
usually happens in the channel sensing period, in which
a secondary user attempting to access a channel conducts
spectrum sensing to decide the presence of a primary user.
If a secondary user senses the attacked channel, it will believe
the primary user is active so that it will not transmit the
data in order to avoid interfering with the primary user. In
this case, the PUE attack is effective since it disrupts the
secondary user’s communication and affects its knowledge of
the spectrum availability. In the other case, if there is no
secondary user attempting to access the attacking channel,
the attacker makes no impact on the secondary user, so the
attack is ineffective. However, the attacker cannot differentiate
between the two cases when it launches a PUE attack on a
channel because no secondary user will be observed on the
attacked channel no matter a secondary user has ever attempted
to access the channel or not.
The key for the attacker to launch effective PUE attacks
is to learn which channel or channels a secondary user
is most likely to access. To do so, the attacker needs to
make observations on the channels. As a result, the attacker’s
performance is dependent on its observation capability. We
define the observation capability of the attacker as the number
of the channels it can observe within the same time slot after
launching the attack. We propose two attacking schemes based
on the attacker’s observation capability. In the first scheme
called Attack-OR-Observe (AORO), an attacker if attacks,
cannot make any observation in a given time slot due to the
short slot duration in highly dynamic systems [13] or when
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the channel switching time is long. We call this attacker an
attacker with no observation capability within the same time
slot (since no observation is possible if it attacks). To learn the
most rewarding channel though, the attacker needs to dedicate
some time slots for observation only without launching any
attacks. On the other hand, an attacker could be able to attack
a channel in the sensing phase and observe other channels in
the data transmission phase within the same time slot if it can
switch between channels fast enough. We call this attacking
scheme, Attack-But-Observe-Another (ABOA).
For the AORO case, we propose an online learning algo-
rithm called POLA -Play or Observe Learning Algorithm- to
dynamically decide between attack and observation and then
to choose a channel for the decided action, in a given time slot.
Through theoretical analysis, we prove that POLA achieves a
regret in the order of O˜(3
√
T 2) where T is the number of slots
the CR network operates. Its higher slope regret is due to the
fact that it cannot attack (gain reward) and observe (learn)
simultaneously in a given time slot. We show the optimality
of our algorithm by matching its regret upper bound with its
lower bound.
For the ABOA case, we propose PROLA -Play and Random
Observe Learning Algorithm- as another online learning algo-
rithm to be applied by the PUE attacker. PROLA dynamically
chooses the attacking and observing channels in each time
slot. The PROLA learning algorithm’s observation policy
fits a specific group of graphs called time-varying partially
observable feedback graphs [14]. It is derived in [14] that
these feedback graphs lead to a regret in the order of O˜(3
√
T 2).
However, our algorithm, PROLA, is based on a new theoretical
framework and we prove its regret is in the order of O˜(
√
T ).
We then prove its regret lower bound is in the order of Ω˜(
√
T )
which matches its upper bound and shows our algorithms’
optimality.
Both algorithms proposed address the attacker’s observation
capabilities and can be applied as optimal PUE attacking
strategies without any prior knowledge of the primary user
activity and secondary user access strategies.
We further generalize PROLA to multi-channel observations
where an attacker can observe multiple channels within the
same time slot. By analyzing its regret, we come to the
conclusion that increasing the observation capability from one
to multiple channels does not give additional benefit to the
attacker in terms of regret order. It only improves the constant
factor of the regret.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We formulate the PUE attack as an online learning
problem without any assumption on the prior knowledge
of either primary user activity characteristics or secondary
user dynamic channel access strategies.
• We propose two attacking schemes, AORO and ABOA,
that model the behavior of a PUE attacker. For the AORO
case, a PUE attacker, in a given time slot, dynamically
decides either to attack or observe; then chooses a channel
for the decision it made. While in the ABOA case, the
PUE attacker dynamically chooses one channel to attack
and chooses at least one other channel to observe within
the same time slot.
• We propose an online learning algorithm POLA for the
AORO case. POLA achieves an optimal learning regret in
the order of Θ˜(3
√
T 2). We show its optimality by matching
its regret lower and upper bounds.
• For the ABOA case, we propose an online learning
algorithm, PROLA, to dynamically decide the attacking
and observing channels. We prove that PROLA achieves
an optimal regret order of Θ˜(
√
T ) by deriving its regret
upper bound and lower bound. This shows that with
an observation capability of at least one within the
attacking slot, there is a significant improvement on the
performance of the attacker.
• The algorithm and the analysis of the PROLA are further
generalized to multi-channel observations.
• Theoretical contribution: For PROLA, despite observing
the actions partially, it achieves an optimal regret order of
Θ˜(
√
T ) which is better than a known bound of Θ˜(3
√
T 2).
We accomplish it by proposing randomized time-variable
feedback graphs.
• We conduct simulations to evaluate the performance of
the proposed algorithms under various system parameters.
Through theoretical analysis and simulations under various
system parameters, we have the following findings:
• With no observation at all within the attacking slot,
the attacker loses on the regret order. While with the
observation of at least one channel, there is a significant
improvement on the attacking performance.
• Observation of multiple channels in the PROLA algo-
rithm does not give additional benefit to the attacker in
terms of regret order. The regret is proportional to
√
1/m,
where m is the number of channels observed by the
attacker. Based on this relation, the regret is a mono-
tonically decreasing and convex function of the number
of observing channels. As more observing channels are
added, the reduction in the regret becomes marginal.
Therefore, a relatively small number of observing chan-
nels is sufficient to approach a small constant factor.
• The attacker’s regret is proportional to
√
K lnK, where
K is the total number of channels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses the related work. System model and problem
formulation are described in Section III. Section IV proposes
the online learning-based access strategies applied by the
attacker and derives the regret bounds. Simulation results are
presented in section V. Finally, section VI concludes the paper
and discusses future work.
The proofs of the lower bounds have been moved to the
Appendix as they closely follow existing lower bound proofs.
II. RELATED WORK
A. PUE Attacks in Cognitive Radio Networks
Existing work on PUE attacks mainly focus on PUE attack
detection [10, 11, 12] and defending strategies [5, 6, 7, 8].
There are few works discussing attacking strategies under
dynamic spectrum access scenarios. In [5, 6], the attacker ap-
plies partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP)
framework to find the attacking channel in each time slot. It
is assumed that the attacker can observe the reward on the
attacking channel. That is, the attacker knows if a secondary
user is ever trying to access a channel or not. In [7, 8], it is
assumed that the attacker is always aware of the best channel to
attack. However, there is no methodology proposed or proved
on how the best attacking channel can be decided.
The optimal PUE attack strategy without any prior knowl-
edge of the primary user activity and secondary user access
strategies is not well understood. In this paper, we fill this gap
by formulating this problem as an online learning problem.
Our problem is also unique in that the attacker cannot observe
the reward on the attacking channel due to the nature of PUE
attack.
B. Multi-armed Bandit Problems
There is a rich literature about online learning algorithms.
The most related ones to our work are multi-armed bandit
(MAB) problems [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. The MAB problems
have many applications in cognitive radio networks with
learning capabilities [7, 20, 21? ]. In such problems, an agent
plays a machine repeatedly and obtains a reward when it takes
a certain action at each time. Any time when choosing an
action the agent faces a dilemma of whether to take the best
rewarding action known so far or to try other actions to find
even better ones. Trying to learn and optimize his actions, the
agent needs to trade off between exploration and exploitation.
On one hand the agent needs to explore all the actions often
enough to learn which is the most rewarding one and on the
other hand he needs to exploit the believed best rewarding
action to minimize his overall regret.
For most existing MAB frameworks as explained, the agent
needs to observe the reward on the taken action. Therefore,
these frameworks cannot be directly applied to our problem
where a PUE attacker cannot observe the reward on the
attacking channel. Most recently, Alon et al. generalize the
cases of MAB problems into feedback graphs [14]. In this
framework, they study the online learning with side obser-
vations. They show in their work that if an agent takes an
action without observing its reward, but observes the reward
of all the other actions, it can achieve an optimal regret in the
order of O˜(
√
T ). However, the agent can only achieve a regret
of O˜(3
√
T 2) if it cannot observe the rewards on all the other
actions simultaneously. In other words, even one missing edge
in the feedback graph leads to the regret of O˜(3
√
T 2).
In this paper, we propose two novel online learning policies.
The first one, POLA, for the case when only either observation
or attack is possible within a time slot, is shown to achieve
a regret in the order of O˜(3
√
T 2). We then advance this
theoretical study by proposing a strategy, PROLA, which is
suitable for an attacker (learning agent) with higher obser-
vation capabilities within the acting time step. We prove that
PROLA achieves an optimal regret in the order of O˜(
√
T )
without observing the rewards on all the channels other than
the attacking one simultaneously. In PROLA, the attacker
uniformly randomly selects at least one channel other than
the attacking one to observe in each time slot. Our framework
is called randomized time-variable feedback graph.
C. Jamming Attacks
There are several works formulating jamming attacks and
anti-jamming strategies as online learning problems [21, 22,
23, 24]. In jamming attacks, an attacker can usually observe
the reward on the attacking channel where an ongoing com-
munication between legitimate users can be detected. Also it is
possible for the defenders to learn whether they are defending
against a jammer or a PUE attacker by observing the reward
on the accessed channel. PUE attacks are different in that
the attacker attacks the channel sensing phase and prevents
a secondary user from utilizing an available channel. As a
result, a PUE attacker cannot observe the instantaneous reward
on the attacked channel. That is, it cannot decide if an attack
is effective or not.
D. Adaptive Opponents
Wang et al. study the outcome/performance of two adap-
tive opponents when each of the agents applies a no regret
learning-based access strategy [21] . One agent tries to catch
the other on a channel and the other one tries to evade it. Both
learning algorithms applied by the opponents are no regret al-
gorithms and are designed for oblivious environments. In other
words, each of the learning algorithms is designed for benign
environments and non of them assumes an adaptive/learning-
based opponent. It is shown in this work, that both opponents
applying a no-regret learning-based algorithm, reach an equi-
librium which is in fact a Nash Equilibrium in that case. In
other words, despite the fact that the learning-based algorithms
applied are originally proposed for oblivious environments,
the two agents applying these algorithms act reasonably well
to achieve an equilibrium. Motivated by this work, in our
simulations in Section V, we have considered a learning-based
secondary user. More specifically, even though we proposed
learning-based algorithms for oblivious environments, in the
simulations, we evaluate its performance in an adaptive en-
vironment. The simulation results show the rationality of the
attacker that even against an adaptive opponent (learning-based
cognitive radio), it performs well and achieves a regret below
the derived upper bound.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a cognitive radio network consisting of several
primary users, multiple secondary users, and one attacker.
There are K (K > 1) channels in the network. We assume
the system is operated in a time-slotted fashion.
A. Primary User
In each time slot, each primary user is either active (on) or
inactive (off). We assume the on-off sequence of PUs on the
channels is unknown to the attacker a priori. In other words,
the PU activity can follow any distribution or can even be
arbitrary.
Figure 1: Time slot structure of a) an SU and b,c,d) a PUE
attacker.
B. Secondary User
The secondary users may apply any dynamic spectrum
access policy [25, 26, 27]. In each time slot, each SU conducts
spectrum sensing, data transmission, and learning in three
consecutive phases as shown in Fig. 1(a).
At the beginning of each time slot, each secondary user
senses a channel it attempts to access. If it finds the channel
idle (i.e., the primary user is inactive), then accesses this
channel; Otherwise, it remains silent till the end of the current
slot in order to avoid interference to the primary user. At the
end of the slot, it applies a learning algorithm to decide which
channel it will attempt to access in the next time slot based
on its past channel access experiences.
We assume the secondary users cannot differentiate the
attacking signal from the genuine primary user signal. That
is, in a time slot, when the attacker launches a PUE attack on
the channel a secondary user attempts to access, the secondary
user will not transmit any data on that channel.
C. Attacker
We assume a smart PUE attacker with learning capability.
We do not consider attack on the PUs. The attacker may
have different observation capabilities. Observation capability
is defined as the number of channels the attacker can observe
after the attack period within the same time-slot. Observation
capabilities of the attacker are impacted by the overall number
of it’s antennas, time slot duration, switching time, etc.
Within a time-slot, an attacker with at least one observation
capability conducts three different operations. First in the
attacking phase, the attacker launches the PUE attack by
sending signals emulating the primary user’s signals [6] to
attack the SUs. Note that, in this phase, the attacker has no
idea if its attack is effective or not. That is, it does not know if
a secondary user is ever trying to access the attacking channel
or not. In the observation phase, the attacker is supposed to
observe the communication on at least one other channel.
The attacker can even observe the attacked channel in the
observation phase, however, in that case it will sense nothing
since it has attacked the channel by emulating the PU signal
and scared away any potential SU attempting to access the
channel. So from learning point of view, observing the attacked
channel does not provide any useful information on the
SUs activity. Therefore, it only gets useful information when
observing channels other than the attacked one. Observing
a different channel, the attacker may detect a primary user
Table I: Main Notation
T total number of time slots
K total number of channels
k index of the channel
It index of the channel to be attacked at time t
Jt index of the channel to be observed at time t
R total regret of the attacker in Algorithm 1
γ exploration rate used in algorithm 2
η learning rate used in Algorithms 1 and 2
pt (i) attack distribution on channels at time t in Algorithms 1 and 2
qt (i) observation distribution on channels at time t in Algorithm 1
ωt (i) weight assigned to channel i at time t in Algorithms 1 and 2
δt observation probability at time t in Algorithm 1
signal, a secondary user signal, or nothing on the observing
channel. The attacker applies its observation in the learning
phase to optimize its future attacks. At the end of the learning
period, it decides which channels it attempts to attack and
observe in the next slot. Fig. 1(b) shows the time slot structure
for an attacker with at least one observation capability.
If the attacker has no observation capability within the
attacking time slot, at the end of each time slot it still applies
a learning strategy based on which, it decides whether to
dedicate the next time slot for attack or observation, then
chooses a channel for either of them. Fig. 1(c,d) show the time
slot structure for an attacker with no observation capability
in the attacking time slot. As shown in these two figures, the
attacker conducts either attack or observation at each time slot.
D. Problem Formulation
Since the attacker needs to learn and attack at the same time
and it has no prior knowledge of the primary user activity or
secondary user access strategies, we formulate this problem as
an online learning problem.
We consider T as the total number of time slots the network
operates. We define xt(j) as the attacker’s reward on channel
j at time slot t (1 ≤ j ≤ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ T ). Without loss of
generality, we normalize xt(j) ∈ [0, 1]. More specifically:
xt(j) =
{
1, SU is on channel j at time t
0, o.w.
. (1)
Suppose the attacker applies a learning policy ϕ to select
the attacking and observing channels. The aggregated expected
reward of attacks by time slot T is equal to
Gϕ(T ) = Eϕ
[
T∑
t=1
xt(It)
]
, (2)
where It indicates the channel chosen at time t to be attacked.
The attacker’s goal is to maximize the expected value of the
aggregated attacking reward, thus to minimize the throughput
of the secondary user,
maximize Gϕ(T ). (3)
For a learning algorithm, regret is commonly used to
measure its performance. The regret of the attacker can be
defined as follows
Regret = Gmax −Gϕ (T ) , (4)
where
Gmax = max
j
T∑
t=1
xt (j) . (5)
The regret measures the gap between the accumulated re-
ward achieved applying a learning algorithm and the maximum
accumulated reward the attacker can obtain when it keeps
attacking the single best channel. Single best channel is the
channel with highest accumulated reward up to time T [17].
Then the problem can be transformed to minimize the regret
minimize Gmax −Gϕ (T ) . (6)
Table I summarizes the main notation used in this paper.
IV. ONLINE LEARNING-BASED ATTACKING STRATEGY
In this section we propose two novel online learning algo-
rithms for the attacker. These algorithms do not require the
attacker to observe the reward on the attacked channel. More-
over, our algorithms can be applied in any other application
with the same requirements.
The first algorithm proposed, POLA, is suitable for an
attacker with no observation capability in the attacking time
slot . For this attacker, either attack or observation is feasible
within each time slot. Based on this learning strategy, the
attacker decides at each time slot whether to attack or observe
and chooses a channel for either of them, dynamically. The
assumption here is that, any time the attacker decides to
make observation, it observes only one channel since time
slot duration has been considered short or switching costs are
high compared to the time slot duration.
The second algorithm, PROLA, is proposed for an attacker
with at least one observation capability. Based on this learning
policy, at each time, the attacker chooses channels dynamically
for both attack and observation. In the following, we assume
the attacker’s observation capability is one. We generalize it
to multiple channel observation capability in Section IV-C.
Both algorithms are considered as no-regret online learning
algorithms in the sense that the incremental regret between
two consecutive time slots diminishes to zero as time goes to
infinity. The first one, POLA, achieves an optimal regret in
the order of O˜(3
√
T 2). This higher slope arises from the fact
that at each time slot, the attacker gains only some reward by
attacking a channel without updating its learning or it learns
by making observation without being able to gain any reward.
PROLA, is also optimal with the regret proved in the order of
O˜(
√
T ). Comparing these algorithms and the generalization of
the latter together shows that, changing from no observation
capability in the same time slot to one observation capability,
there is a significant improvement in the regret order; this is
in comparison to changing from one observation capability
to multiple observation capability which does not give any
benefits in terms of regret order. However, multiple channel
observation capability, provides insight to find the appropriate
number of observations required to achieve the minimum
constant factor in the regret upper bound.
Figure 2: Decision Making process based on the POLA
strategy: First the agent decides between play and observe,
then for either of them chooses a channel dynamically.
A. Attacking Strategy 1: POLA Learning Algorithm
POLA is an online learning algorithm for the learning of
an agent with no observation capability within the attacking
time slot. In other words, the agent cannot play and observe
simultaneously. If modeled properly as a feedback graph as
is shown in Appendix A, this problem can be solved based
on the EXP3.G algorithm presented in [14]. However, our
proposed learning algorithm, POLA, leads to a smaller regret
constant compared to the one in [14] and it is much easier to
understand. Based on the POLA attacking strategy, the attacker
at each time slot decides between attacking and observation,
dynamically. If it decides to attack, it applies an exponential
weighting distribution based on the previous observations
it has made. It chooses a channel uniformly at random if
it decides to make an observation. Figure 2 represents the
decision making structure of POLA. The proposed algorithm
is presented in Algorithm 1.
Since the attacker is not able to attack and observe within
the same time slot simultaneously, it needs to trade off between
attacking and observation cycles. From one side the attacker
needs to make observations to learn the most rewarding
channel to attack. From the other side, it needs to attack often
enough to minimize his regret. So, δt which represents the
trade off between attack and observation needs to be chosen
carefully.
In step 2 of Algorithm 1, xˆt(j) represents an unbiased
estimate of the reward xt(j). In order to derive this value, we
divide the xt(j) by the probability that this channel is chosen
to be observed which is equal to δt/K. This is because in
order for each channel to be chosen to be observed, first the
algorithm needs to decide to observe with probability δt and
then to choose that channel for observation with probability
1
K .
For any agent that acts based on the Algorithm 1, the
following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. For any K ≥ 2 and for any η ≤ 3
√
lnK
K2T , the
upper bound on the expected regret of Algorithm 1
Gmax −E [GPOLA] ≤ (e− 2)ηK
3
4
3
√
(T + 1)
4
K lnK
+
K lnK
4

+
lnK
η
+
3
2
3
√
KT 2 lnK (7)
holds for any assignment of rewards for any T > 0.
Algorithm 1: POLA, Play or Observe Learning Algorithm
Parameter: η ∈
(
0, 3
√
lnK
K2T
]
.
Initialization: ω1(i) = 1, i = 1, ...,K.
For each t = 1, 2, ..., T
1. Set δt = min
{
1, 3
√
K lnK
t
}
.
With probability δt decide to observe and go to
step 2.
With probability 1 − δt decide to attack and go to step
3.
2. Set
qt(i) =
1
K
, i = 1, ...,K
Choose Jt ∼ qt and observe the reward xt(Jt).
For j = 1, 2, ...,K
xˆt(j) =
{
xt(j)
δt(1/K)
, j = Jt
0, o.w.,
ωt+1(j) = ωt(j) exp(ηxˆt(j)),
Go back to step 1.
3. Set
pt(i) =
ωt(i)
K∑
j=1
ωt(j)
, i = 1, ...,K
Attack channel It ∼ pt and accumulate the unobserv-
able reward xt(It).
For j = 1, 2, ...,K
xˆt(j) = 0,
ωt+1(j) = ωt(j),
Go back to step 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The regret at time t is a random variable
equal to,
r(t) =
{
xt(j
∗)−EPOLA,A [xt(It)] ,Attack
xt(j
∗)−EPOLA,O [xt(It)] = xt(j∗) ,Observe
where j∗ is the index of the best channel. The expected
value of regret at time t is equal to
E [r(t)] = (1− δt) (xt(j∗)−EPOLA,A [xt(It)]) + δt xt(j∗),
(8)
where the expectation is w.r.t. to the randomness in the
attacker’s attack policy. Expected value of accumulated regret,
R, is
E [R] = E
[
T∑
t=1
r(t)
]
=
T∑
t=1
(1− δt) (xt(j∗)−EPOLA,A [xt(It)])
+
T∑
t=1
δt xt(j
∗)
≤
T∑
t=1
xt(j
∗)−
T∑
t=1
EPOLA,A [xt(It)] +
T∑
t=1
δt.
(9)
The inequality results from the fact that δt ≥ 0 and
xt(j
∗) = 1. It is also assumed that xt(i) ≤ 1 for all i. Now
the regret consists of two terms. The first one is due to not
attacking the most rewarding channel but attacking some other
low rewarding channels. The second term arises because of
the observations in which the attacker gains no reward. We
derive an upper bound for each term separately, then add them
together.
δt plays the key role in minimizing the regret. First of all, δt
needs to be decaying since otherwise it leads to a linear growth
of regret. So the key idea in designing a no-regret algorithm
is to choose an appropriate decaying function for δt.
From one side, slowly decaying δt is desired from learning
point of view; however, it results in a larger value of regret
since staying more in the observation phase precludes the
attacker from launching attacks and gaining rewards. On the
other hand, if δt decays too fast, the attacker settles in a
wrong channel since it does not have enough time to learn the
most rewarding channel. We choose δt = min
{
1, 3
√
K lnK
t
}
and our analysis shows the optimality of this function in
minimizing the regret.
Below is the derivation of the upper bound for the first term
of regret in equation (9). For a single t
Wt+1
Wt
=
K∑
i=1
ωt(i)
Wt
exp(ηxˆt(i))
=
K∑
i=1
pt(i) exp(ηxˆt(i))
≤
K∑
i=1
pt(i)[1 + ηxˆt(i) + (e− 2)η2xˆ2t (i)]
≤ exp
(
η
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆt(i) + (e− 2)η2
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆ
2
t (i)
)
,
(10)
where the equalities follow from the definition of Wt+1 =∑K
i=1 ωt (i), ωt+1 (i), and pt(i), respectively in Algorithm 1.
Also the last inequality follows from the fact that ex ≥ 1 +x.
Finally, the first inequality holds since ex ≤ 1 + x + (e −
2)x2 for x ≤ 1. In this case, we need ηxˆt(i) ≤ 1. Based
on our algorithm, ηxˆt(i) = 0 if i 6= Jt and for i = Jt we
have ηxˆt(i) = η
xt(i)
δt
1
K
≤ ηK 3
√
T
K lnK , since xt(i) ≤ 1 and
δt ≥ 3
√
K lnK
T for T ≥ K lnK. This is equivalent to η ≤
1
K 3
√
T
K lnK
= 3
√
lnK
K2T .
By taking the ln and summing over t = 1 to T on both sides
of equation (10), the left hand side (LHS) of the equation will
be equal to
T∑
t=1
ln
Wt+1
Wt
= ln
WT+1
W1
= lnWT+1 − lnK
≥ lnωT+1(j)− lnK
= η
T∑
t=1
xˆt(j)− lnK. (11)
By combining (11) with (10),
η
T∑
t=1
xˆt(j)− lnK
≤ η
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆt(i) + (e− 2)η2
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆ
2
t (i).
(12)
We take the expectation w.r.t. the randomness in xˆ, sub-
stitute j by j∗ since j can be any of the actions, use the
definition of EPOLA,A[xt(It)], and with a little simplification
and rearranging the equation we get the following,
T∑
t=1
xt(j
∗)−
T∑
t=1
EPOLA,A [xt(It)]
≤ (e− 2)ηK
T∑
t=1
1
δt
+
lnK
η
. (13)
The upper bound on
T∑
t=1
1
δt
is equal to 34
3
√
(T+1)4
K lnK +
K lnK
4
which gives us,
T∑
t=1
xt(j
∗)−
T∑
t=1
EPOLA,A [xt(It)]
≤ lnK
η
+ (e− 2)ηK
3
4
3
√
(T + 1)
4
K lnK
+
K lnK
4
 .
(14)
The upper bound on the second term of equation (9) is
T∑
t=1
δt =
T∑
t=1
min
1, 3
√
K lnK
t
 ≤ 32 3√KT 2 lnK .
(15)
Summing up the equation (14) and equation (15) gives us
the regret upper bound. 
By choosing appropriate values for η, the above upper
bound on the regret can be minimized.
Corollary 1. For any T > 2.577K lnK, we consider the
input parameter
η =
√√√√√ lnK
(e− 2)K
(
3
4
3
√
(T+1)4
K lnK +
K lnK
4
) .
Then
Gmax −E[GPOLA] ≤ (
√
3(e− 2) + 3
2
)
3
√
T 2K lnK
holds for any arbitrary assignment of rewards.
Proof of Corollary 1. We sketch the proof as follows. By
getting the derivative, we find the optimal value for η. Since
η ≤ 3
√
lnK
K2T , in order for the regret bound to hold, we need
T ≥ 8
3
√
3(e−2)3K lnK = 2.577K lnK. By plugging in the
value of η and some simplifications the regret bound in the
corollary is achieved.

Next is a theorem on the regret lower bound for this prob-
lem under which attacking and observation are not possible
simultaneously.
Theorem 2. For K ≥ 2 and for any player strategy A, the
expected weak regret of algorithm A is lower bounded by
Gmax −E [GA] ≥ v 3
√
KT 2
for some small constant v and it holds for some assignment
of rewards for any T > 0.
Proof of Theorem 2. This follows from the lower bound in
[14]. The construction is given in the Appendix.. 
Based on Theorems 1 and 2, the algorithm’s regret upper
bound matches its regret lower bound which indicates POLA
is an optimal online learning algorithm.
B. Attacking Strategy 2: PROLA Learning Algorithm
In this section, we propose another novel online learning
algorithm that can be applied by the PUE attacker with one
observation capability within the attacking slot. The proposed
optimal online learning algorithm, called PROLA, at each
time, chooses two actions dynamically to play and observe,
respectively. The action to play is chosen based on an expo-
nential weighting, while the other action for observation is
chosen uniformly at random excluding the played action. The
proposed algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.
Figure 3 shows the observation policy governing the actions
for K = 4 in a feedback graph format. In this figure, Yij(t)
is an observation indicator of channel j when channel i is
attacked at time t. We define Yij(t) ∈ {0, 1} such that at each
time for the chosen action i to be played,
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
Yij(t) = 1, i = 1, . . . ,K t = 1, . . . , T. (16)
Algorithm 2 : PROLA, Play and Random Observe
Learning Algorithm
Parameters: γ ∈ (0, 1),
η ∈
(
0, γ2(K−1)
]
.
Initialization: ω1(i) = 1, i = 1, ...,K.
For each t = 1, 2, ..., T
1. Set pt(i) = (1− γ) ωt(i)∑K
j=1 ωt(j)
+ γK , i = 1, ...,K.
2. Attack channel It ∼ pt and accumulate the unobservable
reward xt(It).
3. Choose a channel Jt other than the attacked one
uniformly at random and observe its reward xt(Jt)
based on equation (1).
4. For j = 1, ...,K
xˆt(j) =
{
xt(j)
(1/(K−1))(1−pt(j)) , j = Jt
0, o.w.,
ωt+1(j) = ωt(j) exp(ηxˆt(j)).
In other words, there is a policy that for any channel i
played, only one of the observation indicators takes a value of
one and the rest take a value of zero. For example, if channel 2
is attacked (i = 2), only one of the three outgoing edges from
2 will be equal to one. This edge selection policy represents
the channel selection process for observation. We define it
as a uniform random distribution equal to 1K−1 . We call this
feedback graph, a time-variable random feedback graph. Our
feedback graph fits into the time-variable feedback graphs
introduced in [14] and based on the results derived in that
work, the regret upper bound of our algorithm is O˜(3
√
T 2).
However, based on our analysis, the upper bound on the
attacker’s regret is in the order of O˜(
√
T ) which shows a
significant improvement. In other words, despite the fact that
the agent makes only partial observation on the channels, it
achieves a significantly improved regret order compared to
the no observation in the attacking slot case. This has been
possible due to the new property we considered in the partially
observable graphs which is adding randomness. In the long
run, randomness makes full observation possible to the agent.
In Step 4 of Algorithm 2, in order to create xˆt(j), an
unbiased estimate of the actual reward xt(j), we divide the
observed reward, xt(Jt), by (1/(K − 1))(1 − pt(Jt))which
is the probability of choosing channel Jt to be observed. In
other words, channel Jt will be chosen to be observed if it has
not been chosen for attacking ,(1 − pt(Jt)), and second if it
gets chosen uniformly at random from the rest of the channels,
(1/(K − 1)).
Theorem 3. For any K ≥ 2 and for any η ≤ γ2(K−1) , for the
given randomized observation structure for the attacker the
Figure 3: Channel observation strategy, K = 4
upper bound on the expected regret of Algorithm 2,
Gmax−E[GPROLA] ≤ (e−2)(K−1) η
1− γGmax+
lnK
η(1− γ)
holds for any assignment of rewards for any T > 0.
Proof of Theorem 3. By using the same definition for Wt =
ωt(1) + · · · + ωt(K) =
K∑
i=1
ωt(i) as in Algorithm 1, at each
time t,
Wt+1
Wt
=
K∑
i=1
pt(i)− γ/K
1− γ exp(ηxˆt(i))
≤
K∑
i=1
pt(i)− γ/K
1− γ [1 + ηxˆt(i) + (e− 2)(ηxˆt(i))
2]
≤ exp
(
η
1− γ
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆt(i)
+
(e− 2)η2
1− γ
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆ
2
t (i)
)
. (17)
The equality follows from the definition of Wt+1, ωt+1 (i),
and pt(i) respectively in Algorithm 2. Also, the last in-
equality follows from the fact that ex ≥ 1 + x. Finally,
the first inequality holds since ex ≤ 1 + x + (e − 2)x2
for x ≤ 1. When η ≤ γ2(K−1) , the result, ηxˆt(i) ≤ 1,
follows from the observation that either ηxˆt(i) = 0 or
ηxˆt(i) = η
xt(i)
1
K−1 (1−pt(i))
≤ η(K − 1) 2γ ≤ 1, since xt(i) ≤ 1
and pt(i) = (1− γ) ωt(i)∑K
j=1 ωt(j)
+ γK ≤ 1− γ + γ2 ≤ 1− γ2 .
By taking the logarithm of both sides of (17) and summing
over t from 1 to T , we derive the following inequality on the
LHS of the equation,
T∑
t=1
ln
Wt+1
Wt
= ln
WT+1
W1
≥ lnωT+1(j)− lnK
= η
T∑
t=1
xˆt(j)− lnK. (18)
Combining (17) and (18), we can get
T∑
t=1
xˆt(j)−
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆt(i)
≤ γ
T∑
t=1
xˆt(j) + (e− 2)η
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆ
2
t (i) +
lnK
η
.
(19)
Let x´t(i) = xˆt(i)− ft where ft =
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆt(i). We make
the pivotal observation that (19) also holds for x´t(i) since
ηx´t(i) ≤ 1, which is the only key to obtain (19).
We also note that,
K∑
i=1
pt(i)x´
2
t (i) =
K∑
i=1
pt(i)(xˆt(i)− ft)2
=
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆ
2
t (i)− f2t
≤
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆ
2
t (i)−
K∑
i=1
p2t (i)xˆ
2
t (i)
=
K∑
i=1
pt(i)(1− pt(i))xˆ2t (i). (20)
Substituting x´t(i) in equation (19) and combining with (20),
T∑
t=1
(xˆt(j)− ft)−
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pt(i)(xˆt(i)− ft)
=
T∑
t=1
xˆt(j)−
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆt(i)
≤ γ
T∑
t=1
(
xˆt(j)−
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆt(i)
)
+ (e− 2)η
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pt(i)(1− pt(i))xˆ2t (i) +
lnK
η
. (21)
Observe that xˆt(j) is similarly designed as an unbiased
estimate of xt(j). Then for the expectation with respect to
the sequence of channels attacked by the horizon T ,
E[xˆt(j)] = xt(j),E
[
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆt(i)
]
= E[xt(It)],
and
E
[
K∑
i=1
pt(i)(1− pt(i))xˆ2t (i)
]
= E
[
K∑
i=1
pt(i)(K − 1)xt(i)xˆt(i)
]
≤ K − 1.
We now take the expectation with respect to the sequence
of channels attacked by the horizon T in both sides of the last
inequality of (21). For the left hand side,
E
[
T∑
t=1
xˆt(j)
]
−E
[
T∑
t=1
K∑
i=1
pt(i)xˆt(i)
]
= Gmax −E[GPROLA]. (22)
and for the right hand side,
E[R.H.S]
≤ γ(Gmax −E[GPROLA]) + (e− 2)(K − 1)ηT + lnK
η
Combining the last two equations we get,
(1− γ)(Gmax −E[GPROLA]) ≤ (e− 2)(K − 1)ηT + lnK
η
,
and since Gmax can be substituted by T , by rearranging the
relation above the regret upper bound is achieved.

Similarly, we can minimize the regret bound by choosing
appropriate values for η and γ.
Corollary 2. For any T ≥ 8(K−1) lnKe−2 and γ = 12 , we
consider the following value for η
η =
√
lnK
2(e−2)(K−1)T .
Then
Gmax −E[GPROLA] ≤ 2
√
2(e− 2)
√
T (K − 1) lnK
holds for any arbitrary assignment of rewards.
Proof of Corollary 2. We sketch the proof as follows. By
getting the derivative, we find the optimal value for η. Since
η ≤ γ2(K−1) , in order for the regret bound to hold, we need
T ≥ 8(K−1) lnKe−2 . Replacing the value of η gives us the result
on the regret upper bound. 
The important observation is that, based on [14] such an
algorithm, Algorithm 2, is expected to achieve a regret in the
order of O˜
(
3
√
T 2
)
since it can be categorized as a partially
observable graph. However, our analysis gives a tighter bound
and shows not only it is tighter but also it achieves the regret
order of fully observable graphs. This significant improvement
has been accomplished by introducing randomization into
feedback graphs.
The following theorem provides the regret lower bound for
this problem.
Theorem 4. For any K ≥ 2 and for any player strategy A,
the expected weak regret of algorithm A is lower bounded by
Gmax −E[GA] ≥ c
√
KT
for some small constant c and it holds for some assignment
of rewards for any T > 0.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof follows closely the lower
bound proof in [28]. Details are provided in the Appendix. 
C. Extension to Multiple Action Observation Capability
We generalize Algorithm PROLA to the case of an agent
with multiple observation capability. This is suitable for an
attacker with multiple observation capability when the attacker
after the attack phase can observe multiple other channels
within the same time-slot. At least one and at most K − 1
observations are possible by the agent (attacker). In this
case, m indicates the number of possible observations and
1 ≤ m ≤ K − 1. Then, for m observations, we modify
equation (16) as follows,
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
Yij(t) = m, i = 1, . . . ,K t = 1, . . . , T. (23)
The probability of a uniform choice of observations at each
time,
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
Yij(t) = m is equal to 1(K−1m )
. Corollary 3 shows
the result of the analysis for m observations.
Corollary 3. If the agent can observe m actions at each time,
then the regret upper bound is equal to
Gmax −E [GA] ≤ 4
√
(e− 2)
√
T
K − 1
m
lnK.
This regret upper bound shows a faster convergence rate when
making more observations.
Proof of Corollary 3. We substitute 1/ (K − 1) by
m/ (K − 1) in Step 4 of Algorithm PROLA since at
each time, m actions are being chosen uniformly at random.
Then the regret upper bound can be derived by similar
analysis. 
As our analysis shows, making multiple observations does
not improve the regret in terms of its order in T compared to
the case of making only one observation. This means that only
one observation and not more than that is sufficient to make
a significant improvement in terms of regret order reduction
compared to the case of no observation within the attacking
slot. The advantage of making more observations however is in
reducing the constant coefficient in the regret. Making more
observations leads to a smaller constant factor in the regret
upper bound. This relationship is non-linear though. i.e., the
regret upper bound is proportional to
√
1
m which means that
in order to make a large reduction in the regret in terms of
its constant coefficient impact, only a few observations would
suffice. Our simulation results in Section V-C provide more
details on this non-linear relationship.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the simulation results to evaluate
the validity of the proposed online learning algorithms applied
by the PUE attacker. All the simulations are conducted in
MATLAB and the results achieved are averaged over 10,000
independent random runs.
We evaluate the performance of the proposed learning
algorithms, POLA and PROLA, and compare them with
their theoretical regret upper bounds O˜(3
√
T 2) and O˜(
√
T ),
respectively. POLA and PROLA correspond to an attacker
with no observation and one observation capability within the
attacking time slot, respectively. We then examine the impact
of different system parameters on the attacker’s performance.
The parameters include the number of time slots, total number
of channels in the network, and the distribution on the PU
activities. We also examine the performance of an attacker
with multiple observation capabilities. Finally we evaluate
a secondary user’s accumulated traffic with and without the
presence of a PUE attacker.
K primary users are considered, each acting on one chan-
nel. The primary users’ on-off activity follows a Markov
chain or i.i.d. distribution in the network. Also, the PU
activities on different channels are independent from each
other. K idle probabilities are generated using MATLAB’s
rand function, each denoting one PU activity on each chan-
nel if PUs follow an i.i.d. Bernoulli distributions. pI =
[0.85 0.85 0.38 0.51 0.21 0.13 0.87 0.7 0.32 0.95] is a
vector of K elements each of which denotes the corre-
sponding PU activity on the K channels. If the channels
follow Markov chains, for each channel, we generate three
probabilities, p01, p10, and p1 as the transition probabil-
ities from state 0 (on) to 1 (off), from 1 to 0, and the
initial idle probability, respectively. The three vectors below,
are examples considered to represent PU activities. p01 =
[0.76 0.06 0.3 0.24 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.95 0.94 0.55], p10 =
[0.14 0.43 0.23 0.69 0.22 0.59 0.21 0.58 0.34 0.73], and
p1 = [0.53 0.18 0.88 0.66 0.23 0.87 0.48 0.44 0.45 0.88].
The PUE attacker employs either of the proposed attacking
strategies, POLA, or PROLA. Throughout the simulations,
when we talk about an attacker employing PROLA, we assume
the attacker’s observation capability is one within the attacking
slot, unless otherwise stated.
Since the goal here is to evaluate the PUE attacker’s per-
formance, for simplicity we consider one SU in the network.
Throughout the simulations, we assume the SU employs an
online learning algorithm called Hedge [16]. The assumption
on the Hedge algorithm is that the secondary user is able
to observe the rewards on all the channels in each time
slot. Hedge provides the minimum regret in terms of both
order and the constant factor among all optimal learning-
based algorithms. As a result the performance of our proposed
learning algorithms can be evaluated in the worst case scenario
for the attacker. As explained in Section II, even though in our
analysis we considered an oblivious environment, in the sim-
ulations we can consider an SU that runs Hedge (an adaptive
opponent). This experimental setup adds value since it shows
that our proposed online learning-based algorithms perform
reasonably even against adaptive opponents by keeping the
occurred regret below the theoretical bounds derived.
A. Performance of POLA and the impact of the number of
channels
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithm, POLA and compare it with the theoretical analysis.
Figure 4(a) shows the overall performance of the attacker
for both cases of i.i.d. and Markovian chain distribution of
PU activities on the channels for K = 10. Regret upper
bound and lower bound from the analysis in Corollary 1 and
Theorem 2, respectively are also plotted in this figure. Then we
examine the impact of the number of channels in the network
on it’s performance. We consider K variable from 10 to 50.
The attacker’s regret when PUs follow i.i.d. distribution and
Markovian chain for different number of actions are shown in
Fig. 4(b) and (c), respectively. Since POLA has a regret with
(a) POLA Learning (b) POLA, channel impact, i.i.d. PU (c) POLA, channel impact, M.C. PU
(d) PROLA Learning (e) PROLA, channel impact, i.i.d. PU (f) PROLA, channel impact, M.C. PU
(g) PROLA, channel impact, i.i.d. PU (h) PROLA, observation impact, i.i.d. PU (i) PROLA, observation impact, M.C. PU
Figure 4: Simulation results under different PU activity assumptions
higher slope, in order to better observe the results, we have
plotted the figures for T from 1 to 20, 000. We can observe
the following from the figures.
• Regardless of the PUs activity type, the occurred regret
is below the regret upper bound achieved from the
theoretical analysis.
• The regret on all three figures has a higher slope com-
pared to the results for PROLA in Fig. 4(d)-(f) which
also complies with our analysis. The higher slope in these
figures can be seen by comparing their x and y axises.
• As the number of channels increases the regret increases
as is expected based on the analysis from Corollary 1.
• As the number of channels increases, the regret does
not increase linearly with it. Instead, the increment in
the regret becomes marginal which complies with the
theoretical analysis. Based on Corollary 1 the regret is
proportional to (3
√
K lnK). The dependency on K can be
represented by plotting the regret versus K as is shown
in the next subsection.
B. Performance of PROLA and the impact of the number of
channels
We compare the performance of the proposed learning
algorithm, PROLA, with the theoretical analysis from section
IV. We consider a network of K = 10 channels. Fig. 4(d)
shows the simulation results as well as analytical results. From
the simulations, we observe that the actual regret occurred
in the simulations, is between the bounds achieved from the
analysis regardless of the type of PU activity which complies
with our analysis. We also note that when we derived the
theoretical upper bound we did not make any assumption on
the PU activity. The regret is only dependent on the K and T .
Then, we examine the impact of the number of channels
in the network on the attacker’s performance when it applies
PROLA. Figure 4(e) and (f) show the attacker’s regret when
PUs follow i.i.d. distribution and Markovian chain respectively
for K variable from 10 to 50. The same discussion on the
system parameters and the results hold as in subsection V-A.
Figure 5: Accumulated Traffic of an SU
In another representation, we plot the regret versus the number
of channels, K, as the x axis in Fig. 4(g).
Moreover, comparing regret values in Fig. 4(a) with those
in Fig. 4(d), we observe the huge difference in regret amount
between no observation capability within the attacking slot and
one observation capability.
C. Impact of the number of observations in each time slot
We consider PROLA algorithm with K = 40 channels in
the network. The number of observing channels, m, varies
from 1 to 35. Figure 4(h) and (i) show the performance of
the PROLA for m = 1, 3, 8, 18, 35 when the PUs follow i.i.d.
distribution and Markovian chain on the channels, respectively.
We can observe the following from the simulation results.
• As the observation capability of the attacker increases, it
achieves a lower regret. This observation complies with
the Corollary 3 provided in Section IV-C based on which
we expect smaller constant factor as the observation
capability increases.
• In the beginning, even adding a couple of more ob-
serving channels (from m = 1 to m = 3), the regret
decreases dramatically. The decrement in the regret be-
comes marginal as the number of observing channels be-
comes sufficiently large (e.g., from m = 18 to m = 35).
This observation implies that, in order to achieve a good
attacking performance (smaller constant factor in regret
upper bound), the attacker does not need to be equipped
with high observation capability. In the simulation, when
the number of observing channels (m = 10) is 14 of
the number of all channels (K = 40), the regret is
approaching to the optimal.
D. Accumulated Traffic of SU with and without attacker
We set K = 10 and measure the accumulated traffic
achieved by the SU with and without the presence of the
attacker. The attacker employs the PROLA algorithm. Fig-
ure 5 shows that the accumulated traffic of the SU is largely
decreased when there is a PUE attacker in the network for
both types of PU activities.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we studied the optimal online learning al-
gorithms that can be applied by a PUE attacker without any
prior knowledge of the primary user activity characteristics
and secondary user channel access policies. We formulated
the PUE attack as an online learning problem. We identified
the uniqueness of PUE attack that even though a PUE attacker
cannot observe the reward on the attacking channel, but is able
to observe the reward on another channel. We proposed a novel
online learning strategy called POLA for the attacker with
no observation capability in the attacking time slot. In other
words, this algorithm is suitable when simultaneous attack and
observation is not possible within the same time slot. POLA
dynamically decides between attack and observation, then
chooses a channel for the decision made. POLA achieves a
regret in the order of Θ˜(3
√
T 2). We showed POLA’s optimality
by matching its regret upper and lower bounds. We proposed
another novel online learning algorithm called PROLA for an
attacker with at least one observation capabilities. For such an
attacker, the attack period is followed by an observation period
during the same time slot. PROLA introduces a new theoretical
framework under which the agent achieves an optimal regret
in the order of Θ˜(
√
T ). One important conclusion of our study
is that with no observation at all in the attacking slot in the
POLA case, the attacker loses on the regret order, and with
the observation of at least one channel in the PROLA case,
there is a significant improvement on the performance of the
attacker. This is in contrast to the case where increasing the
number of observations from one to m ≥ 2, does not make that
much difference, only improving the constant factor. Though,
this observation can be utilized to study the approximate
number of observations required to get the minimum constant
factor. The attacker’s regret upper bound has a dependency
on the number of observations m as
√
1/m. That is, the
regret decreases overall for an attacker with higher observation
capability (larger m). However, when the number of observing
channels is small, the regret decreases more if we add a
few more observing channels. While, the decreased regret
will become marginal when more observing channels are
added. This finding implies that an attacker may only need
a small number of observing channels to achieve a good
constant factor. The regret upper bound also is proportional
to
√
K lnK which means the regret increases when there are
more channels in the network. The proposed optimal learning
algorithm, PROLA, also advances the study of online learning
algorithms. It deals with the situation where a learning agent
cannot observe the reward on the action that is taken but can
partially observe the reward of other actions. Before our work,
the regret upper bound is proved to be in the order of O˜(3
√
T 2).
Our algorithm achieves a tighter regret bound of O˜(
√
T )
by randomizing the observing actions which introduces the
concept of time-variable random feedback graphs. We show
this algorithm’s optimality by deriving its regret lower bound
which matches with its upper bound.
As for future work, we believe that our work can serve as
a stepping stone to study many other problems. How to deal
with multiple attackers will be interesting, especially when
the attackers perform in a distributed manner. One other inter-
esting direction is to study the equilibrium between the PUE
attacker(s) and secondary user(s) when both of them employ
learning based algorithms. Integrating non-perfect spectrum
sensing and the ability of PUE attack detection into our model
will also be interesting especially that the PUE attacker may
interfere with the PU during spectrum sensing period which
can make it detectable by the PU. From theoretical point of
view, our result shows only one possible case that the feedback
graph despite being partially observable, achieves a tighter
bound. A particular reward structure may allow for O˜(
√
T )
regret even in partially observable graphs.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. We sketch the proof as follows. The
problem of the PUE attacker with no observation capability
within the attacking time slot can be modeled as a feedback
graph. Feedback graphs are introduced in [14] based on which
the observations governing the actions are modeled as graphs.
More specifically, in a feedback graph, the nodes represent the
actions and the edges connecting them show the observations
made while taking a specific action. Fig. 6 shows how our
problem can be modeled as a feedback graph.
In this figure, nodes 1 to K represent the overall number
of actions. There are K more actions however in this figure.
These K extra actions are required to be able to model our
problem with the idea of feedback graphs. Actions K+1 up to
2K represent the observations; i.e., any time the agent decides
to make an observation, it is modeled as an extra action. There
are K channels and we model any observation on each channel
with a new action which adds up to 2K actions overall. The
agent gains a reward of zero if it chooses the observation action
since it is not a real action. Instead, it makes an observation
on the potential reward of its associated real action.
So, this problem can be modeled as a feedback graph and it
in fact turns out to be a partially observable graph [14]. In [14],
it is proved that the regret lower bound for partially observable
graphs is Ω(ν 3
√
KT 2) which completes the proof. 
B. Proof of Theorem 4
The proof here is similar to the lower bound analysis of
EXP3 given in proof of Theorem 5.1, Appendix, in [17]. We
mention the differences here. For this analysis the problem
setup is exactly the same as the one in [17]. The notations
and definitions are also the same as given in the first part of
the analysis in [17]. Below we bring some of the important
notations and definitions used in the analysis here to keep the
clarity of our analysis and to make our analysis self contained;
Figure 6: Modeling the Attacker with no observation capability
within the attacking slot with a feedback graph
however, the reader is referred to [17] for more details on the
definitions of notations.
The reward distribution on the actions are defined as fol-
lows. One action is chosen uniformly at random to be the good
action. Below is the reward distribution on the good action, i
for all t = 1, ..., T ,
xt(i) =
{
1, 1/2 + 
0, o.w.,
(24)
where  ∈ (0, 1/2]. The reward distribution on all other
actions is defined to be one or zero with equal probabilities.
P∗ {·} is used to denote the probability w.r.t. this random
choice of rewards to play. Pi {·} represents the probability
conditioned on i being the good action. Also, Punif {·} shows
the probability with respect to uniformly random choice of
rewards on all actions. O notation is also used to denote the
probability w.r.t. observation. Analogous observation probabil-
ity O∗ {·}, Oi {·}, Ounif {·} and expectation notations, E∗[·],
Ei[·], Eunif [·] are used.
The agent’s access/attack policy is denoted by A. rt =
xt(it) is a random variable which its value shows the reward
gained at time t. rt =< r1, . . . , rt > is a sequence of rewards
received till t and r is the entire sequence of rewards. GA =
T∑
t=1
rt is the gain of the agent and Gmax = max
j
T∑
t=1
xt(j). The
number of times action i is chosen by A is a random variable
denoted by Ni.
Lemma 1 Letf : {0, 1}T −→ [0,M ] be any function
defined on reward sequences r. Then for any action i,
Ei[f(r)] ≤ Eunif [f(r)] + M2
√−Eunif [Oi] ln(1− 42).
Proof.
Ei[f(r)]−Eunif [f(r)] =
∑
r
f(r)(Oi {r} −Ounif {r})
≤
∑
r:Oi{r}≥Ounif{r}
f(r)(Oi {r} −Ounif {r})
≤M
∑
r:Oi{r}≥Ounif{r}
(Oi {r} −Ounif {r})
=
M
2
‖Oi −Ounif‖1 . (25)
We also know from [29, 17] that,
‖Ounif −Oi‖21 ≤ (2 ln 2)KL(Ounif ||Oi). (26)
From chain rule for relative entropy we derive the following,
KL(Ounif ||Oi) =
T∑
t=1
KL(Ounif
{
rt|rt−1
} ||Oi {rt|rt−1})
=
T∑
t=1
(Ounif {it 6= i}KL(1
2
|| 1
2
))
+ (Ounif {it = i}KL(1
2
|| 1
2
+ ))
=
T∑
t=1
Ounif {it = i} (−1
2
lg(1− 42))
= Eunif [Oi](−1
2
lg(1− 42)). (27)
The lemma follows by combining (25),(26), and (27). 
Proof of Theorem 4. The rest of the analysis in this part is
similar to the analysis in Theorem A.2 in [17], except that
when we apply lemma 1 to Ni, we reach the following
inequality,
Ei[Ni] ≤ Eunif [Ni] + T2
√−Eunif [Oi] ln(1− 42).
where
K∑
i=1
√
Eunif [Oi] ≤
√
KT . By considering the obser-
vation probability and making a little simplification the upper
bound is achieved. Following similar steps as in Theorem A.2
in [17] for the rest of the analysis gives us the regret lower
bound equal to ω(c
√
KT ) which completes the proof. 
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